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1. Introduction
Despite being originally developed for military purposes, the unique prop-
erties of ad hoc networks make them very suitable for civilian and commercial
purposes. These networks will open up new avenues across the full breadth of fu-
ture information technologies. A diverse set of applications exploiting the ad hoc
network communication paradigm in a number of different situations, are today a
reality. Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), which are typically used for monitor-
ing and observing physical phenomena [1]. These networks have also been used
for deploying communication and data networks in emergence situations, like in
the hurricane Katrina [2] crisis, in 2006. Wireless Mesh Networks (WMN) are
another interesting example of ad hoc network. They are capable of providing
affordable Internet access to little or isolated populations far away from big city
centres [3]. In the future, it is expected that many other application domains will
benefit from ad hoc networks, e.g., Vehicular Ad hoc NETworks (VANET) [4]
to enhance passengers comfort and safety, or aeronautical ad hoc networks [5] to
increase the data rate of in-flight broadband Internet access.
Routing protocols are the backbone of ad hoc networks. Routing protocols
create complete routes between every pair of nodes from the topology information
they are able to perceive. Reactive ones, establish routes under demand (such as
LAR1 [6], AODV [7], DSR [8], TORA [9] and SrcRR [10]), whereas proactive
protocols periodically exchange routing information (such as WRP [11], OLSR
[12], DSDV [13], Babel [14] and B.A.T.M.A.N [15]).
Regardless their type, there are different factors that limit the capability of
routing protocols to provide a persistent routing in spite of threats (also known
as resilience [16]). On one hand, the evolutions of the interacting nodes can-
not all be anticipated and controlled a priori given the dynamic conditions of the
environment, e.g. mobility, energy extenuation or interferences in the wireless
communication channel may favour the occurrence of accidental faults [17]. On
the other, the implicit trustworthiness relationship established between neighbour
nodes may be exploited by malicious faults (also referred to as attacks). The oc-
currence of these accidental faults and attacks in the system may dramatically
affect its expected behaviour. Such events may partition the network or induce a
certain traffic overhead, thus causing retransmission, inefficient routing and im-
pacting the quality of service provided to the upper system layers. So, designing
ad hoc routing protocols with resilience in mind is essential for their successful
exploitation [18]. In order to mitigate the effect of potential accidental faults and
attacks on default versions of routing protocols, some authors have proposed se-
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cure and fault-tolerant alternatives. Some examples are SEAD [19], SOLSR [20],
SAODV [21] or CONFIDENT [22].
Traditionally, simulation has been the platform of choice to evaluate these se-
cure and fault-tolerant protocols. However, there is growing awareness of the fact
that current simulators make several simplifying assumptions to model many es-
sential characteristics of real systems, thus limiting the credibility of their results
[23]. The gap between simulated and experimental results may lead to differ-
ences between the behaviour of the simulated network and that of the real one.
This gap becomes extremely important when addressing real systems that may
be supported by these protocols, especially when human lives are at risk, large
economic losses may derive from their malfunctioning or even when the repu-
tation of service providers may be dramatically affected in non-critical domains.
So, it is of prime importance to validate theoretical design and analysis of routing
protocols and algorithms with sound experiments that are representative of their
final deployment. Thus, the experimental resilience evaluation of ad hoc routing
protocols plays an essential role to determine the confident use of ad hoc routing
protocols.
Unfortunately, this evaluation typically involves the execution of real experi-
ments that are inherently complex, normally time-consuming to set up and exe-
cute, and hard to repeat by other researchers. Basically, the difficulty to recreate
and quantify the impact of the wide amount of faults and attacks threatening ad
hoc routing protocols, is one of the reasons hindering their resilience evaluation.
Following previous axes, the goal of this article is to review, discuss, and clas-
sify the existing experimental platforms and testbeds for ad hoc networks to shed
light on how these platforms address the challenges of experimental evaluation
from a resilience perspective. In addition, we discuss their limitations and high-
light future research issues.
To address this goal, the rest of the publication is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 presents related work. Section 3 presents current platforms for the evalua-
tion of such protocols. Section 4 studies the the measures typically used in their
evaluation and the challenges they present. Section 5 analyses the experimental
characteristics of current widely-used evaluation platforms in ad hoc networks.
Section 6 identifies the lacks of such proposals when addressing the interpretation
of obtained measures. Finally Section 7 presents the conclusions of the survey
stating how the characteristics of resilience evaluation may contribute to enhance
the quality features of the evaluation.
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2. Related work
In the last years, some works have deeply analysed the evaluation techniques
used in the domain of ad hoc networks. In [24], the authors classify the formal and
non-formal techniques to evaluate ad hoc networks. This classification is used to
discuss about common elements of existing protocol validation approaches. The
goal is to show how to take advantage of such similarities, thus optimising the
evaluation time. In [25], the authors present an analysis of the platforms to per-
form real-world experimentation. In particular, they report the technology used for
the implementations as well as on key findings from real experiments. Similarly,
in [26], the authors present an extensive survey covering real world and emulation
testbeds in the domain of ad hoc networks. However, in these papers there is a
lack of taxonomies to properly characterise evaluation platforms. The work pre-
sented in [27] proposes an interesting taxonomy to classify testbeds according to
their heterogeneity, concurrency, scale, mobility, repeatability, user involvement
and federation. However, it is finally used to characterise only five platforms. In
general, all these works pose the need of more experimental platforms to allow for
protocol validation and proof-of-concept implementations. However, they mainly
focus on the performance perspective of the problem whereas the key resilience
aspects of these platforms (posed in the introduction) are not analysed.
Alternatively, there is a wide variety of surveys that focus on secure and fault-
tolerant routing protocols. For instance, [28] compares different security routing
techniques to face threats based on various criteria. The work done in [29] and
[30] performs a similar analysis but addressing the particular domain of WSNs.
Additionally, in [31] and [32], the authors respectively analyse the concept of trust
and security in state-of-the-art secure routing mechanisms for MANETs. How-
ever, these works do not explore the platforms considered to evaluate these secure
and fault tolerant routing protocols, beyond the classic paradigm used: simula-
tion, emulation or real-world experimentation. This is mainly due to the fact that
the faults and attacks considered to exercise these routing protocols are typically
implemented ad hoc for the purpose of each study. This choice is justified given
the lack of open (and thus reusable) resilience evaluation platforms that enable
the implementation of very particular threats. Without the aim of being exhaus-
tive, Table 1 lists some of the wide amount of accidental faults and attacks used
in the evaluation of secure and fault-tolerant routing protocols. Some of them are
accidental while others are malicious. In any case, most of them have a transient
nature given the dynamic features of ad hoc network deployments. Some of them,
like variable signal interferences, or fading, are inherited from the traditional un-
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steadiness and openness of the wireless communication medium while others,
such as power consumption or accidental and malicious topological changes, are
acquired given the unique properties of ad hoc networks. An in-depth analysis of
the devices used in ad hoc networks shows that hardware gets more sensitive to
manufacturing faults as the scale of components decreases. Likewise, increasing
the level of sophistication of embedded software like operating systems or mid-
dleware leads to higher rates of design, programming, and configuration faults
[17, 18].
Table 1: Accidental faults and attack used during the evaluation of secure routing protocols.
Network characteristic Main threats identified
Resources limitations Physical damage [33], peak in service demand [34], flood-
ing attack [35], neighbours saturation [36], battery extenu-
ation [37]
Wireless communication
medium
Signal attenuation [38], multifading [39], ambient noise
[40], jamming attack [41], exposed node [42], traffic analy-
sis [43], cryptanalysis [44]
Mobility of nodes Wrong nodes distribution [45], wrong routing protocol con-
figuration [46], sequence number replay [35], replay attack,
sybil attack [18], tampering attack [47], Doppler shift [4]
Absence of infrastructure Sink hole, black hole [48], selective forwarding attack [49],
jellyfish attack [50]
In conclusion, we can point out a lack of surveys that analyse how resilience is
addressed by current evaluation platforms for ad hoc routing protocols. There ex-
ist many and varied challenges in the deployment of ad hoc routing protocols, but
the need for frameworks to evaluate and justify their resilience is, without doubt,
one of the most important. It is worth pointing out the difficulty to recreate and
quantify the impact of the wide amount of accidental faults and attacks threaten-
ing ad hoc networks. However, their use in evaluation platforms is essential to
determine whether the risks to which ad hoc networks are exposed are acceptable
or not.
Projects such as DBench [51], introduce the principles of comparative evalu-
ation of systems, basically identifying three main stages: (i) the experiments con-
figuration, where the system measures are specified; (ii) the experiments execu-
tion, which presents the experimental properties that evaluation platforms should
satisfy (including the capacity to inject faults and attacks in the system); and (iii)
the analysis of results, that introduces the keys of measurements processing.
In our prior work [52], we briefly identified the three dimensions introduced
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in the DBench project in the the domain of ad hoc networks. In the present paper
we ambition at studying how current evaluation approaches for ad hoc routing
protocols address these three basic aspects. In consequence, next Section will
introduce the most well-known evaluation platforms for ad hoc routing protocols
in the last decade, which will be the target of our survey.
3. Evaluation platforms and routing protocols
This section briefly introduces most of current evaluation platforms in the
domain of ad hoc networks. Let us present them according to the three major
strategies to address the evaluation of ad hoc routing protocols: use of models,
prototypes or emulation.
3.1. Evaluation platforms
Model-based approaches use formal techniques like classic process algebras
[53], timed automata [54], model checking [33] or the use of Stochastic Activity
Networks (SAN), an extension of Stochastic Petri Nets [55] to recreate real-world
characteristics. These approaches are finally animated through discrete-event sim-
ulation platforms [56]. Simulation platforms are in general a good option to check
design proposals and discard them before they become too costly to modify in
next stages of their lifecycle. Most well-known approaches today are Network
Simulator (NS) 2 [57] and 3 [58], Opnet [59] and Glomosim [60].
Conversely to simulation, real-world prototyping, that refers to the execution
of experiments in real scenarios, provides most representative results to evaluate
ad hoc networks. Real-world prototyping is a good option to evaluate mature
developments in their expected environment. In the bibliography it is possible
to find different open-source prototype-based approaches enabling the use of real
devices and applications, such as Roofnet [61], Floornet [62], the Ad Hoc Protocol
Evaluation Testbed (APE) [63], the Reconfigurable Mobile Multi-hop Wireless
Network Testbed (MINT) [64], Indriya [65], or the Testbed for Wireless Indoor
Experiments (TWIST) [66].
Emulation is a hybrid solution halfway simulation and prototype-based evalu-
ation platforms. Emulation is the most recommendable option to quickly evaluate
developments (being mature or not) in different scenarios. It considers typical el-
ements from real deployments like the use of real devices and applications, and
simulates others that are difficult to recreate and repeat, like mobility. Some of the
most representative platforms are the Open-Access Research Testbed for Next-
Generation Wireless Networks (ORBIT) [67], the Carnegie Mellon University
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Wireless Emulator (CMUWE) [68], Castadiva [69], Mobiemu [70], Emulab [71]
and the Resilience Evaluation Framework for Ad Hoc Networks (REFRAHN)
[72].
3.2. Evaluation of routing protocols
On one hand, some of these evaluation platforms, basically those based on
simulation, are built in such a way that any routing protocol model they may eval-
uate must be compatible with the platform. This involves that routing protocol
models must be implemented in the language used by the platform, which typi-
cally differs from one to another. The difficulty to find routing protocol models
guaranteeing an acceptable quality for a given simulator is a limitation that leads
simulators developers to include a minimum set of implementations in their plat-
form by default. Table 2 present default routing protocols implemented for each
simulator.
Table 2: Protocol-dependent evaluation platforms.
Evaluation platform Routing protocols considered by default
Opnet Opnet [59] AODV, DSR, TORA
NS2 [57] AODV, DSR, OLSR, DSDV
NS3 [58] AODV, OLSR, DSDV
Glomosim [60] AODV, DSR, DSDV LAR1, WRP
On the other hand, prototype- and emulation-based platforms are normally
routing-protocol-independent. This characteristic eases the evaluation of a given
routing protocol implementation in different platforms. Consequently, conversely
to model-based platforms, they do not require to include any set of routing proto-
cols by default for users. Table 3 provides a list of well-known protocols, as well
as the works where they have been evaluated by targeted platforms.
4. Experiments configuration
According to [51], the selection of measures is one of the key aspects of the
experiment configuration. Regarding their typology, experimental measures can
be classified according to their capacity to provide a confident insight of the per-
formance, resources consumption and resilience of the systems under evaluation.
Measures can be generic, if applicable to any ad hoc network or routing pro-
tocol (such as throughput); or concrete, if they just make sense in a limited subset
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Table 3: Protocol-independent evaluation platforms.
Evaluation
platform
Routing protocols evaluated
CMUWE DSR [73]
ORBIT AODV [74], OLSR [74]
Castadiva AODV [75], OLSR [75]
Emulab DSMR [76], DSRP [76], OLSR [77], BMX6 [77]
Mobiemu AODV [78, 79], OLSR [78]
REFRAHN AODV [72], OLSR [72], SOLSR [72], B.A.T.M.A.N [72], Babel [72]
NetEye TMA [80]
TutorNet CTP [81], MultihopLQI [81]
Senslab RPL [82]
Wisebed Digimesh [83]
Roofnet SrcRR [84]
Floornet OLSR [62]
APE AODV [63], OLSR [63]
MINT AODV [64]
Indriya ORW [85], CTP [85], TMA [80]
TWIST ORW [85], CTP [85]
Citysense OLSR [86]
(such as the Expected Transmission Count, also referred to as ETX [87], a mea-
sure that can be only considered in routing protocols whose routes are computed
using the notion of link quality). Despite this last type enables to acquire a more
detailed observation of the system, its particular nature makes their consideration
inadequate for the comparison of heterogeneous evaluation platforms that pursue
different purposes. Thus, to ease such comparison, this paper focuses on generic
measures.
4.1. Performance measures
Performance measures are in general widely-used in the domain of ad hoc
networks since they easily represent the behaviour of their functional aspects.
In particular, considered evaluation platforms typically rely on quality-of-service
measures to characterise the behaviour of the system such as Throughput, Packet
delivery ratio, Packet loss, Delay, Routing overhead and Link flapping.
• Probably, Throughput is one of the most considered measures in the bibliog-
raphy of ad hoc networks. It estimates the average amount of information
correctly delivered (typically in Mbits and Kbits) per time unit (normally
a second). Throughput, also referred to goodput when just computing ap-
plicative (non-routing) traffic, is usually computed between the source and
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destination nodes of a communication route, or as a general measure to
estimate the overall behaviour of a network. This measure is interpreted
the higher the better. Experimental platforms such as Opnet [59], NS2/3
[57, 58], Glomosim [60], CMUWE [68], ORBIT [67], Castadiva [69], Em-
ulab [71], MobiEmu [70], Roofnet [61], Floornet [62], MINT [64], Indriya
[85], TWIST [85] and Citysense [86] employ it.
• The Packet delivery ratio (PDR) is similar to throughput but considering the
percentage of packets correctly delivered with respect to the total sent. Eval-
uation platforms such as Opnet, NS2/3, Glomosim, CMUWE, REFRAHN
[72], Senslab [88], Wisebed [89], APE [63], Indriya, NetEye and TutorNet
provide this measure.
• Packet loss is the percentage of packets not delivered from the total sent.
As one can deduce, this measure complements the delivery ratio. From a
performance viewpoint, this measure is the lower the better. Opnet, NS2/3,
Glomosim, ORBIT, REFRAHN, Wisebed, Indriya and TWIST are the eval-
uation platforms providing packet loss by default.
• Delay is the average time required by a packet to get from source to des-
tination. Obviously, the longer it is, the worse for the network behaviour.
Together with throughput, delay is one of the most used measure in the
domain of ad hoc networks. Given its popularity, is it widely considered
by Opnet, NS2/3, Glomosim, CMUWE, ORBIT, Castadiva, Emulab, Mo-
biEmu, REFRAHN, Wisebed, Roofnet, MINT, Indriya and TWIST.
4.2. Resources consumption measures
In the domain of ad hoc networks, the consideration of resources consumption
measures typically concerns routing overhead and energy consumption.
• Routing overhead represents the rate of packets exchanged between the
nodes to keep the routing protocol operative. Since a high value may over-
load the wireless communication channel, thus reducing its capacity to trans-
port applicative packets, best routing protocols are typically those providing
lower levels of routing overhead. Opnet, NS2/3, Glomosim, Senslab and
Wisebed are examples of evaluation platforms providing this measure.
• Energy consumption is a measure that computes the energetic waste of rout-
ing protocols. It is specially useful in environments where the battery is a
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limited resource, although it can also be considered as a measure of added-
value in green computing to make aware users about a responsible con-
sumption. This measure is provided by evaluation platforms such as Opnet,
NS2/3, Glomosim, Senslab, Wisebed and REFRAHN.
4.3. Resilience measures
Research in the field of resilience evaluation [16], highlights the importance
of characterising the ability of ad hoc networks to detect, diagnose, repair, and re-
store the normal behaviour of the system in presence of faults and changes. Thus,
in case of threats, the routing protocol with the lowest and more accurate detection
and diagnosis time could be able to react faster and, consequently, limit the effect
of threats in the system. Likewise, low repair and restoration times are interest-
ing to reduce the system downtime. Some of the measures that characterise the
resilience of ad hoc networks are Link flapping, Number of eliminated links, Link
availability, Link integrity, Threat exposure and Perturbation effectiveness. Con-
sidering them may complement traditional evaluation, for example, by assisting
evaluators to select the more robust ad hoc routing protocol for a given system.
• The Link flapping is a measure to determine the number of times a commu-
nication route changes the links. Although the dynamic alternation of links
can be understood as a mechanism to react against changes, a high link flap-
ping can be also counter-productive due to its impact on the convergence
time of links. So, the higher it is, the worse for the network behaviour.
APE, Senslab, Indriya and TutorNet are the only approach providing it by
default.
• The Connectivity is computed as the ratio between broken and established
links along the experimentation time. Despite it could be also considered a
measure of performance, its usefulness to estimate the volatility of neigh-
bours with respect to a node led us to finally classify it as a resilience mea-
sure. Approaches such as APE and Roofnet consider this measure.
• The Route availability is a measure that determines the percentage of time
a communication route was ready to be used with respect to the total time.
The higher the better for the network. REFRAHN is the only evaluation
platform that provides this measure by default.
• The Packet integrity computes the average percentage of packets received at
destination nodes whose content was not illegitimately altered by malicious
10
nodes with respect to the total time of experimentation. The higher this
value, the better. REFRAHN is the only evaluation platform that provides
this measure by default.
• The Threat exposure determines the average percentage of time the commu-
nication route was exposed to any perturbation with respect to the total time
of experimentation. The lower the better. REFRAHN is the only evaluation
platform that provides this measure by default.
• The Perturbation effectiveness represents the average percentage of the threat
exposure time when the perturbation succeeded on impacting the network
behaviour. The lower the better from a resilience viewpoint. REFRAHN is
the only evaluation platform that provides this measure by default.
Table 4: Summary of measures considered by current evaluation platforms.
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Resilience
Link flapping 3 3 3 3 3
Connectivity 3
Route availability 3
Route integrity 3
Threat exposure 3
Pertur. effective-
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3
4.4. Measures analysis
Table 4 summarises the measures previously listed in this Section. Results
show how the behaviour of ad hoc routing protocols is massively characterised
through performance measures reporting the throughput, delay, routing overhead
or the packet delivery ratio exhibited by the network. Indeed, almost 90% of the
evaluation platforms considered in this study provide throughput and delay as a
reference measure, which is an example of how to date, the evaluation of ad hoc
routing protocols has been generally limited to functional aspects.
11
Additionally, it is worth noting that non-functional aspects surprisingly re-
mains in the background. With respect to resources consumption, few measures
are normally considered. In particular, only those evaluation platforms that are
able to recreate networks with resources limitations, such as wireless sensor ones,
consider them. From a resilience viewpoint, it is striking the limited presence of
measures to quantify other interesting aspects related to the ability of the system
to coexist and tolerate the presence of threats in the system. Although there are
studies that evaluate the impact of threats in the system through the degradation
of mainstream performance measures (process typically referred as performabil-
ity evaluation), it is also necessary the definition and use of specific resilience
measures to understand and explain the behaviour of routing protocols. This lack
is one of Achilles’ heels in the evaluation of ad hoc networks. Concretely, RE-
FRAHN seems being the approach providing the widest variety of measures, of-
fering 66% of the total of measures provided in general by all the evaluation plat-
forms. We claim that more platforms are necessary to cover the gap between the
ad hoc networks we are able to design and implement, and the confident service
they are able to deliver.
5. Experimental procedure
Once measures studied, it is necessary to determine the experimental proce-
dure to obtain them. Although many authors in the domain of ad hoc networks
present measures that appear generally correct and sensible, sometimes the ap-
proach followed to obtain them varies from a paper to another [93]. This fact is
due to the lack of widespread rules and practices to conduct their assessment fol-
lowing reference or standardised criteria, which hinders the comparison of mea-
sures. Consequently, while the focus is set of the results they provide, the quality
of the evaluation platforms is seldom discussed. Most surveys in the field of eval-
uation platforms of ad hoc routing protocols limit their contribution to classify
existing proposals according to their typology (i.e., if they rely on simulation,
real-world experimentation or emulation). But beyond this fact, the implications
of such design decisions are not rigorously analysed or quantified.
5.1. Desirable properties of resilience evaluation platforms for ad hoc routing
protocols
The present section defends the interest of identifying and quantifying a set
of basic properties as a criterion to assess the resilience of ad hoc routing proto-
cols. To cope with this goal, this paper proposes to consider the properties used to
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characterise dependability benchmarks [94]. Dependability benchmarks represent
an agreement between the industry and/or the user community, gathering aspects
such as the way and conditions under which measurements are obtained. This fact
necessarily involves the properties they must satisfy are well-defined and widely-
accepted. Such properties gather operational aspects (such as controllability and
observability, which are essential attributes of control theory [95]), metrologi-
cal aspects (such as intrusiveness, repeatability and accuracy, typically applied
to measurement systems [96], and other maintainability aspects (such scalabil-
ity, portability, configurability, traditionally used in performance benchmarks like
TPC [97]). Furthermore, as a novelty, we introduce the notion of injectability to
determine the capability of platforms to introduce changes and faults in the system
under evaluation.
Hence, these properties, as explained in Table 5), can be useful to charac-
terise the level of adequacy of current evaluation platforms from a more objective
viewpoint. In concordance, Table 7 qualitatively characterises previous properties
according to three intuitive levels: high, medium and low.
Once such three-level criteria established, characterising current evaluation
platforms results an easier task. Next subsection studies the evaluation platforms
introduced in this survey according to such a classification.
5.2. Critical characterisation of evaluation platforms
Given the diversity and heterogeneity of considered evaluation platforms, it
is very difficult to establish clear criteria to compare existing tools, which hin-
ders the selection of the appropriate approach. Hereafter, evaluation platforms are
classified according to the levels of satisfaction of the properties under study.
5.2.1. Model-based approaches
More than 80% of works about evaluation in the domain of ad hoc networks
is based on simulation [23]. This is because experiments are highly controllable,
repeatable, scalable and, since no real device is considered, they present a low
level of intrusiveness. Indeed, simulation platforms such as NS2 [57], NS3 [58],
Opnet [59] or Glomosim [60] can scale the network up to thousands of nodes
considering well-known mobility patters such as Random Way Point (RWP) or
Manhattan. However, while the open-source nature of platforms such as NS2
and NS3 or Glomosim is highly configurable, other proprietary solutions such as
Opnet lack of support to integrate additional configuration options (such as a wider
variety routing protocols by default). With regard to their portability, all these
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Table 5: Desired properties in an evaluation platform for ad hoc routing protocols.
Property Description
Controllability Ability of the evaluation platform to move the internal state of a system from any
initial state to any other final state in a finite time interval [98]. The higher the better.
Observability Capability of the evaluation platform to infer the behaviour of the system under
evaluation through measurements [98]. The higher the better.
Intrusiveness Degree of perturbation (either spatial or temporal) introduced in the evaluation plat-
form by monitoring probes, workload/faultload generators and control components
[96]. The lower the better.
Repeatability Property of the evaluation platform to provide statistically equivalent measures
through the same experimental procedure in the same location and operating condi-
tions [96]. The higher the better.
Accuracy Degree of closeness of measurements of a quantity to that quantity’s actual (true)
value [96]. The higher the better.
Scalability Property related to the easiness to increment (or decrement) the dimensions of the
experiment or the size of the evaluation platform (e.g., number of nodes, data flows,
etc) [99]. The higher the better.
Portability Capability to deploy and use the same evaluation platform (including both hardware
and software components) to evaluate different systems [99]. The higher the better.
Configurability Capability of the evaluation platform to configure different types of experiments
through a wide variety of parameters and options which do not restrict its use (type
of nodes, data flows, mobility patters, etc) [100]. The higher the better.
Computational
complexity
Degree of difficulty of the evaluation platform to address or solve complex experi-
mentation using its computational resources [99]. The lower the better.
Injectability Capability of the evaluation platform to animate the behaviour of the system through
a fault-load and a change-load. The higher the better.
simulators are typically available for a wide set of architectures and operating
systems, which makes them highly portable.
Unfortunately, the execution of network models may require a heavy compu-
tation, which involves a high computational complexity. Furthermore, in any case,
most of the results obtained from simulation are based on assumptions which typ-
ically simplify in excess the behaviour of the system and limits the accuracy of
results, potentially leading researchers to biased or wrong conclusions. For exam-
ple, simulations have been criticised for not using realistic mobility models [101]
or because of assuming unrealistic wireless medium characteristics [102]. From a
viewpoint of resilience, it is worth noting the low level of injectability presented
in default implementations of current simulation platforms. However, this char-
acteristic is shared with the rest of approaches, as we will see in next subsections.
Probably, due to this reason, observability is typically bounded by the type and
amount of measurements that system probes are able to collect, which in practice
is limited to performance measures. To some extent, this point justifies the lack of
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Table 6: Qualitative levels for the characterisation of evaluation platforms.
Property High Medium Low
Controllability Given all initial times and all initial states, the eval-
uation platform state always evolves towards the ex-
pected state in the proper time. The platform imple-
ments mechanisms to correct all the potential devia-
tions in the control of experiments.
Given all initial times and all initial states, the evalu-
ation platform state evolves towards a final state that,
despite slightly deviated from the expected at some
finite time, can be accepted as correct. Implemented
mechanisms to correct potential deviations in the con-
trol of experiments may not be enough to exactly con-
duct the system towards the desired state.
Given all initial times and all initial states, the evalua-
tion platform evolves towards a transient states which
does not guarantee reaching a final state at some finite
time. The platform does not implement mechanisms
to correct some potential deviations in the control of
experiments, or they are ineffective.
Observability The evaluation platform is instrumented with probes
in such a way it is easy for the user to take any type
of measurements from any layer or component of the
system under evaluation.
The probes deployed by the evaluation platform limit
the type or amount of measurements the user may take
from the system under evaluation.
The probes deployed by the evaluation platform limit
the type and amount of measurements the user may
take from the system under evaluation.
Intrusiveness The measurements obtained from the platform are
spatially and temporally influenced by internal
components (e.g., the monitoring probes, work-
load/faultload generators and control components) or
external interferences (e.g., the wireless channel).
The measurements obtained from the platform are
either spatially or temporally influenced by inter-
nal components (e.g., the monitoring probes, work-
load/faultload generators and control components) or
external interferences (e.g., the wireless channel).
The measurements obtained from the platform are not
influenced by internal components (e.g., the monitor-
ing probes, workload/faultload generators and control
components) or external interferences (e.g., the wire-
less channel), or their effect is negligible.
Repeatability The evaluation platform is able to repeat the same
events in the same order, experiment after experiment,
and the measurements observed from the system un-
der evaluation are exactly the same.
The evaluation platform is able to repeat the same
events in the same order, experiment after experi-
ment, but the system under evaluation is subjected to
sources of uncertainty that avoid the measurements
observed are exactly the same.
Neither the evaluation platform is able to repeat the
same events in the same order, experiment after ex-
periment, nor the measurements observed from the
system under evaluation are exactly the same, which
hardens the comparability of results during their anal-
ysis.
Accuracy The experiments deployed by the evaluation platform
are representative of the behaviour of the system un-
der evaluation in the real world. All the elements of
the system under evaluation are real.
The evaluation platform makes some assumptions or
simplifications in the experimentation. Some of the
elements of the system under evaluation may not be
real (e.g., the mobility of nodes or the type of nodes).
The evaluation platform implements a model of the
system under evaluation. As any element of the sys-
tem under evaluation is real, obtained measurements
may radically vary from the expected depending on
the goodness of the model.
Scalability The evaluation platform enables the increment of the
number of resources or assets involved in the experi-
mentation (e.g., the number of nodes, the number of
data flows, etc) very easily and it is completely afford-
able.
The evaluation platform enables the increment of the
number of resources or assets involved in the experi-
mentation (e.g., the number of nodes, the number of
data flows, etc) with a moderate effort and/or a rela-
tively affordable cost.
The evaluation platform does not enable the incre-
ment of the number of resources or assets involved
in the experimentation (e.g., the number of nodes, the
number of data flows, etc), or it is very costly in terms
of time or money.
Portability The evaluation platform is designed using a clear
specification and/or methodology, and implemented
using software and hardware COTS as long as possi-
ble, which eases that other evaluators may replicate
the platform in a different location.
The evaluation platform is either designed using a
clear specification and/or methodology, or it is imple-
mented through custom software and hardware com-
ponents, which hardens that other evaluators may
replicate the platform in a different location.
The evaluation platform is neither designed using a
clear specification and/or methodology, nor it is im-
plemented using software and hardware COTS.
Configurability The evaluation platform can be easily configured to
enable the execution of different types of experiments
through a wide variety of parameters and options
which do not restrict its use (e.g., type of nodes, mo-
bility patters, routing protocol, etc). Furthermore, it is
open to easily admit the introduction of new types of
parameters.
The evaluation platform can be configured to en-
able the execution of different types of experiments
through a wide variety of parameters and options
which do not restrict its use (e.g., type of nodes, mo-
bility patters, routing protocol, etc), or it is open to
admit the introduction of new types of parameters.
The evaluation platform cannot be configured to en-
able the execution of different types of experiments,
and it cannot admit the introduction of new types of
parameters.
Computational
complexity
The execution duration of the experiments carried
out in the evaluation platform strongly depends on
the complexity of experiments, and the complexity
of experiments may require a considerable processing
power and memory to execute an experiment.
The execution duration of the experiments carried
out in the evaluation platform strongly depends on
the complexity of experiments, and the complexity
of experiments may require a considerable processing
power or memory to execute an experiment.
The execution duration of the experiments carried out
by the evaluation platform is independent from the
complexity of experiments. One second of experi-
mentation is equivalent to one second of real time.
Injectability The evaluation platform is able to introduce a wide
variability of accidental and malicious faults in the
system and dynamically change the evolution of
nodes mobility.
The evaluation platform is only able to either intro-
duce a limited amount of faults in the system or dy-
namically change the evolution of nodes mobility.
The evaluation platform does not support neither the
introduction of any fault in the system nor the dy-
namic change of nodes mobility.
resilience measures previously observed in Section 4.
5.2.2. Prototype-based approaches
Generally, most of prototype-based approaches are custom-built for specific
projects addressing performance aspects, and are consequently non-reusable for
other experiments and purposes. Furthermore, as real devices are used, these plat-
forms are more difficult to manage and control. However, their accuracy is high
as far as the experiments executed are representative of the real world. This fact
also reduces the system complexity because the system does not require the use of
models. External (unpredictable) sources of signal interference may affect the in-
trusiveness and controllability of this kind of platforms. This means that effective
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throughput is much more lower than the nominal, given the lack of control over
the external interferences.
The scalability of these platforms varies from tens to hundreds of nodes. In
the first case, we can consider evaluation platforms such as Roofnet [61], Floornet
[62] or Citysens [86]. Two features make these testbeds particularly interesting:
their realism and domain specificity provided by a permanent outdoor installa-
tion in an urban environment and the realization of the control and management
based solely on wireless links. In the second case, indoor testbeds such as In-
driya [65] and TWIST [66] are able to deploy up to 120 and 204 usb-based motes
respectively. All of them are projects deployed for conducting experiments to un-
derstand the nature of large-scale wireless networks. So they are able to provide
more repeatable experiments given their static nature. However, they lack of flex-
ibility for the deployment of different topologies. Alternatively, some others like
APE [63] provide experiments with mobility, but these experiments are difficult
to configure and repeat because node movement must be reproduced manually or
through self-moving devices (such as programmable robots, in the case of [64]).
Furthermore, there exist some limitations regarding the type of mobility of nodes
or their speed, that bound their configurability.
From an injectability viewpoint, most of these approaches present a low level.
Exceptionally, TWIST and MINT present a medium level. TWIST enables the
injection of accidental faults given its capability to support on-the-fly configu-
ration changes. Thus, TWIST is able to emulate the death of sensor nodes due
to energy depletion (fault injection) or the addition of new nodes to the network,
while assuring complete repetitiveness of the experiment across different software
solutions. MINT is able to orchestrate the recreation of accidental faults such as
packet dropping. However, the effect of such perturbations is just appreciated
through performance measures. Since all the analysed platforms are instrumented
with probes to observe the performance of the network, their observability is sim-
ilar to the exhibited by simulators.
5.2.3. Emulation-based approaches
Generally, the easiness to control emulators enhances the repeatability of the
evaluation platform. However, the simplification of certain elements such as mo-
bility, unavoidably reduces the accuracy of the experiments with respect to the
values obtained through real-world experiments. Regarding the system complex-
ity, the time required to execute experiments considering mobility models is in-
dependent from the complexity of the model used. Normally the model is offline
precomputed before the experimentation, thus not affecting the experimentation
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time.
Typically, emulators can be subdivided into physical and MAC layer emu-
lators. In physical layer ones, emulators mangle the radio signal emitted by the
wireless network interface cards of the nodes to mimic the effects that radio waves
would experience in a real-world setup. One possibility to do this is to attenuate
the emitted signal as shown in [103] using Radio Frequence (RF) attenuators. OR-
BIT [67] and NetEye [91] are indoors radio grid of fixed nodes that works in that
way. ORBIT deploys 400 nodes while NetEye installs up to 130 motes. Since,
each node is actually static the mobility of each node in is emulated through a sep-
arate mobility server. Unfortunately, the topology generation is limited to the grid
mobility model, which reduces the platform configurability. Similarly, CMUWE
[68] and TutorNet [81] are indoors evaluation platform defined to be shared by
multiple users. They support real devices (up to tens of routers in the case of
CMUWE and hundreds of them in the case of TutorNet), applications, and MAC
and physical layers on a network-wide scale while maintaining experimental con-
trol and repeatability. However, the fact of sharing the same resources of the plat-
form (i.e., the same control network or the same communication channel) with
other users concurrently, involves assuming certain degree of intrusiveness in the
experiment results.
Since in MAC layer emulators all the nodes are in the same radio range, they
filter the packets that should receive each node according to the desired topology:
if a node is emulated to be within radio range of another node, a filtering approach
allows the exchange of packets between them, if the nodes are out of each oth-
ers range, such packets are dropped. Thus, each node applies its own rules to
determine its visibility with the rest of nodes of the network. Some examples of
this approach are Castadiva [69], Mobiemu [70] and Emulab [71]. While the first
thee platforms are characterised by the exclusive use of resources, the last one is a
shared testbed. By dynamically adding and removing filter rules, the emulator can
also create scenarios with node movement. This characteristic enables this type of
evaluation platforms to be quite configurable. REFRAHN [72], is an alternative
solution characterised by the exclusive use of resources that enables the recreation
of both accidental an malicious faults to assess their impact in ad hoc routing pro-
tocols. Conversely to the rest of emulators, the capability to inject more than ten
different sources of threat encompassing generic (protocol independent) perturba-
tions such as signal attenuation, ambient noise, battery extenuation, traffic peak;
and protocol-dependent ones that must be instantiated according to the particular
nature of each routing protocol such as sink hole attack, replay attack, tampering
attack, selective forwarding attack, jellyfish attack, flooding attack, neighbour sat-
17
uration and sequence number replay, (protocol dependent), provides REFRAHN
a high injectability. This platform is instrumented with probes to take measure-
ments of performance, resilience and energy consumption to provide a high ob-
servability of the system.
In general, the scalability and portability of emulators is limited given the level
of ambient noise generated by the high concentration of devices in a reduced same
area. To face this problem, initiatives such as Senslab [88] and Wisebed [89] pro-
vide large federated platforms composed of multiple testbeds. Senslab deploys
1024 motes and it is distributed among 4 interconnected locations in France, 2 of
which offer access to mobile nodes implemented by robots. Similarly, Wisebed
considers in- and outdoor 750 motes in 9 different locations in Europe and mobil-
ity is supported using 40 mobile robots.
5.3. Analysis of evaluation strategies
Model-based evaluation platforms provide a high degree of controllability, re-
peatability, configurability and scalability to study different types of networks in a
repeatable way. However, its most important disadvantage is the limited accuracy
of results. Most of the results obtained from these works, are based on assump-
tions which typically simplify in excess the behaviour of the system, which might
lead researchers to biased or wrong conclusions. Conversely, the highest degree
of applicability and therefore transferability of results, is given in the case of pro-
totype or real deployments. However, experiments are typically non-repeatable
given the difficulty of recreating of actual deployments and the unsteadiness of
the wireless communication medium. Furthermore, the cost from the viewpoint
of the use of real hardware and the manpower required, limits the scalability of
the approach. Emulation is a hybrid approach comprised of both real and virtual
parts representing a trade-off between prototype-based and model-based propos-
als. The advantage of emulation environments over real world experiments is the
possibility of scaling to larger scenarios with a minor effort. However, the degree
of realism in emulation strongly depends on which components or actions of the
system are real or virtualised (devices, mobility, network interfaces, etc).
It is worth mentioning that neither simulation, nor real-world prototyping nor
emulation present, by design, a significant advantage neither from the viewpoint
of observability, nor the capability of introducing threats in the system (defined as
injectability). Instead, it depends of the particular evaluation platform to deploy
such capacities. From all the evaluation surveyed, REFRAHN is that providing
with the highest levels of observability and injectability. This can be explained
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because, as seen in Section 4, REFRAHN proposes the evaluator a set of mea-
sures a wide variety of resilience measures. In consequence, REFRAHN needs to
animate the system with the presence of threats, and instrument different types of
probes to observe its behaviour from different perspectives. We claim that more
practical evaluation platforms like REFRAHN are required to address the execu-
tion of experiments from a resilience viewpoint. Table 7 summarises the different
evaluation alternatives referred in this section.
Table 7: Comparative review of evaluation platforms.
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Glomosim [60] High Medium Low High Low High High High High Low
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CMUWE [68] Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Low Low Low Low
ORBIT [67] Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium High Low Low Low Low
Castadiva [69] Medium Medium Low Medium Medium Medium High High Low Low
Emulab [71] Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium Low Low Low
MobiEmu [70] Medium Medium Low Medium Medium Medium High High Low Low
REFRAHN [72] Medium High Low Medium Medium Medium High High Low High
NetEye [91] Medium High Low Medium Medium High High High Low High
TutorNet [92] Medium High Medium Medium Medium High High High Low High
Senslab [88] Low Medium Low Low High High Medium Low Low Medium
Wisebed [89] Medium High Medium Medium Medium High High High Low High
R
ea
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Roofnet [61] Medium Medium Low Medium High Medium Medium Medium Low Low
Floornet [62] Medium Medium Low Medium High Medium Medium Medium Low Low
APE [63] Low Medium Low Low High Medium Medium Low Low Low
MINT [64] Low Medium Low Low High Medium Medium Low Low Medium
Indriya [65] Low Medium Low Low High Medium Medium Low Low Low
TWIST [66] Low Medium Low Low High High Medium Low Low Medium
Citysense [86] Low Medium Low Low High High Medium Low Low Medium
6. Analysis and interpretation of results
The analysis of results is crucial as the conclusions of the resilience evaluation
will rely on this stage. Once measures processed, resilience evaluators face a cru-
cial problem that strongly influences the analysis of results. To be useful, the mea-
sures extracted must be correctly interpreted following systematic criteria. The
context where the ad hoc network is deployed is a key factor that should be taken
into account, as measures of the same network in different contexts could be inter-
preted in many different ways. Despite the importance of this point, most of the
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evaluation platforms considered in this survey still analyse measures generically
without applying a proper interpretation about where the network is deployed in.
As we have seen in the previous section, the controllability and repeatability of
experiments is essential in resilience evaluation. However, and without taking im-
portance away from this point, controllability and repeatability also affects other
stages of the evaluation process, such as the analysis of results. The reader should
understand that resilience evaluation introduces the need of performing a more
complex analysis of target systems, considering their behaviour in the presence
of faults and attacks, and characterising such behaviour with a larger set of mea-
sures, including dependability and security specific ones. This evidence becomes
a challenge when considering the evaluation of distributed systems formed by a
large and heterogeneous set of sub-systems and components. The challenge is
there not only for the amount of measures to consider, but also for their variety of
origin and typology. To date, the analysis of evaluation results in ad hoc networks
has been an aspect strongly relying on the human factor. Evaluators subjectively
interpret measures following key criteria that are usually omitted in the reports.
In consequence, repeating the same analysis of measures and obtaining the same
conclusions, even when results are the same, becomes a complex task.
The underlying problem of controllability and repeatability in the analysis of
measures in the domain of ad hoc networks reveals that most proposals limit their
purpose to the delivery of measures. By the time being, the fact of considering
a representative set of measures has been traditionally enough to justify their se-
lection [23]. However, the approach to quantitatively analyse such measures is
usually focused only on the numerical output, whereas little or no attention is
devoted to their interpretation. Without contextualising their meaning through-
out factors such as the environment, the type of system targeted, or the evaluation
performer, same results may have different interpretations depending on the evalu-
ation consumer’s subjectivity. From a practical viewpoint, the comparison among
different systems becomes quite hard, if not meaningless. Even if the effort is
performed, the analysis and interpretation of results remains an error-prone pro-
cess requiring a very deep expertise in the domain of ad hoc networks and routing
protocols, increasing the uncertainty of evaluation analyses, and thus affecting the
credibility of the conclusions obtained. This ambiguous interpretation of concepts
is commonly known as semantic heterogeneity [104].
This challenge could be addressed through a process of semantic reconcilia-
tion [104]. Such process involves covering the existing gap between the explicit
result of the evaluation, that is, the conclusions distilled from the analysis of mea-
sures, and the implicit real intention of evaluators, which concerns the interpre-
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tation procedure to obtain such conclusions. This fact increases the sensitivity
of analyses, potentially revealing surprising insights about the system under eval-
uation. This approach is specially useful when there is no obvious optimal (or
unanimous) solution due to the large number of criteria that need to be taken into
account, or when decisions often require the fulfilment of conflicting objectives
(e.g., design or choice of ad hoc routing protocols maximising their dependability
or performance). It has also the potential for improving the work of system eval-
uators by leading them to unequivocal and more objective conclusions. Unfortu-
nately, to date, the semantic reconciliation remains an rarely issue in the domain
of evaluation platforms for ad hoc networks. In particular, REFRAHN is the only
approach from the list of evaluation platforms from Table 7 stating the mandatori-
ness of addressing this challenge. REFRAHN orchestrates a multi-criteria anal-
ysis methodology to ease the multiple interpretations that the measures issued
from performance, resources consumption and resilience evaluation may have de-
pending on the criteria followed by evaluators. The goal of this methodology is
to make explicit the subjective interpretation rules that evaluators typically apply
implicitly when determining to what extent measures satisfy evaluation require-
ments. Doing this in a systematic and repeatable way is essential when different
evaluators need to make a fair comparison of their results, so the methodology
relies on a mathematical formalism. Second, defining our methodology in such
a way it may satisfy the conflicting positions between (i) those evaluation con-
sumers that prefer having all the possible measures as field data for enabling deep
result analysis and promote data sharing among community members [105] (e.g.,
people from academia), and (ii) those adopting a more pragmatical viewpoint that
ask for an small set of meaningful and representative scores to characterise, rank
and compare evaluated systems [106] (e.g., people from industry). To cope with
this goal REFRAHN relies on the notion of quality model, adopted from ISO/IEC
25000 standards [107], to formulate not only rigorous but also usable and flexible
interpretation rules.
Despite the efforts done in REFRAHN, there are still open questions requiring
further research in the analysis of evaluation measures such as (i) how to system-
atically aggregate such measures to capture in a single or small set of scores the
information required to characterise the overall system quality, and (ii) how to
ensure the consistency of interpretations issued from the use of such scores with
respect to the conclusions obtained from the direct analysis of evaluation mea-
sures. The choice for a representation of measures has important consequences in
terms of expressiveness. Simplistic approaches may skew in excess the represen-
tation of the model, whereas representations with a high expressiveness can add
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unnecessary complexity to the model or can be cumbersome in its use for decision
making. Therefore it is important to find an equilibrium between the possibility
of representing as much situations as possible but at the same time maintaining a
good degree of usability.
7. Conclusion
Resilience is an essential non-functional aspect when studying the effect of
faults and changes in ad hoc networks. However, it is to note that current market
demands a reduction in the cost of production and the time to commercialisation
of solutions and services. Under these conditions it is very difficult to guarantee
an acceptable level of resilience. This problem becomes specially meaningful in
those application contexts where the incorrect behaviour of the network may im-
ply a severe economic or human loss. Even in less critic environments, resilience
may have a decisive impact on the reputation of the service provider, thus con-
ditioning the level of penetration of the product within the market. This fact has
increased the need for designing new and efficient techniques and tools to evaluate
not only the functional aspects of ad hoc network systems, but also non-functional
ones.
This paper has explored existing gaps in the practical evaluation of ad hoc
routing protocols to determine which are the impairments limiting a better un-
derstanding about the resilience of ad hoc networks. Thus, the lack of resilience
measures, the difficulty in recreating the presence of threats, and the absence of
approaches to guide the interpretation of issuing results is a challenging task in
practice that, to date, limits the achievement of this goal. The deliberated intro-
duction of threats in the system, as well as the consideration of resilience mea-
sures to estimate their impact on ad hoc networks and the systematisation of user-
friendly techniques to interpret them in a repeatable way could result useful to
evaluate the ability of routing protocols to keep on providing the routing service
despite the activation of faults and the presence of changes. To date, the interest is
not only in proposing new fault tolerance mechanisms to face such impairments,
but in providing methodologies and tools to introduce these aspects within the
evaluation of ad hoc networks. There exist many and varied challenges in the
deployment of ad hoc routing protocols, but the need for frameworks to evalu-
ate and justify their resilience is, without doubt, one of the most important. By
the time being, most initiatives in the domain of ad hoc networks, like CeNSE
[108], WiSeNts [109] or GENI [110] focus their goal in the deployment of ad hoc
networks formed by massively interconnected devices measuring and processing
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data in real-time. However, such efforts will remain questionable in practice while
suitable techniques to guarantee acceptable levels of resilience in their implemen-
tations remain unavailable. The resilience evaluation of ad hoc routing protocols
opens new opportunities to study how the dynamic features of ad hoc networks
may affect their dependability. This aspect is very important to estimate how good
(or bad) a given routing protocol or fault tolerance complement adapts to changes
in the environment. Likewise, resilience evaluation could be very useful to assess
the risk of subjecting (new or existing) fault tolerance mechanisms to the presence
of known threats they were designed (or not) against.
Ad hoc networks are now in a stage where more practical aspects need to be
investigated. Among them, resilience evaluation is essential to drive a stronger
market penetration in the context of medium- and large-scale wireless networks
and to enable the use of new applications and services in existing networks, thus
stimulating market competition, as well as business models and realistic use cases
to make this technology appealing for public institutions and private companies.
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